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Abstract
This paper derives conditions for two key Keynesian propositions in a simple IS-LM
model: (a) the paradox of thrift, and (b) the crowding-in of private investment ex-
penditures by government expenditures. A linear specification of the model is then
presented as a special case that can be used for empirical analysis. Using data for the
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1 Introduction
The “paradox of thrift” and the “crowding-in” of private investment expenditure by gov-
ernment expenditure are two key propositions within the Keynesian tradition. Both these
propositions, among others, have been points of debate between Keynesian and Monetarist
(mark I and mark II) economists over the last five decades. This paper throws some light on
these long standing debates within macroeconomics in two ways. First, it derives the condi-
tions for the occurrence of both the paradox of thrift and crowding in of private investment
within a simple IS-LM model of short-run fluctuations of a capitalist economy; and second,
it estimates the parameters of a linear specification of the model using instrumental variables
regression and uses them to devise a novel test to investigate whether there is any empiri-
cal evidence in support of the paradox of thrift and the crowding-in of private investment
expenditure.
The paradox of thrift refers to a situation where consumers’ efforts to increase savings by
reducing autonomous consumption expenditures can, in fact, lead to either no change or a
decrease in aggregate savings in the short run. For it is possible that when consumers’ reduce
autonomous consumption expenditures ceteris paribus, the ensuing fall in aggregate demand
leads to a much lower level of equilibrium output. Thus, though consumers’s save more out
of every unit of output, aggregate savings might be lower than, or equal to, that obtaining
in the original situation because aggregate output has itself fallen relative to its original
level. The paradox of thrift demonstrates, in a straightforward manner, the operation of the
fallacy of composition, the proposition that what might be true for the individual need not
necessarily be true for the aggregate.
The paradox of thrift has a long intellectual history and finds mention in several places in
Keynes’ General Theory. Discussing the apparent conflict between the savings-investment
equality and the decisions of individuals to save as they choose, Keynes points out that
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savings, like spending, is a two-sided affair.
“For although the amount of his own saving is unlikely to have any significant
influence on his own income, the reactions of the amount of his consumption on
the incomes of others makes it impossible for all individuals simultaneously to
save any given sums. Every such attempt to save more by reducing consumption
will so affect incomes that the attempt necessarily defeats itself.” (p. 84, Keynes,
1964)
In the chapter devoted to “notes on mercantilism”, Keynes gives a brief historical sketch
of the life of the related idea that under-consumption can lead to unemployment, starting
with Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees and running all the way up to the work of the
English socialist J. A. Hobson (pp. 358-71, Keynes, 1964). Though the paradox of thrift
has gradually percolated even to mainstream macroeconomics textbooks (Blanchard, 2008),
to the best of my knowledge it has not been studied in any great detail, especially from an
empirical angle. This paper attempts to partially fill in that lacuna.
The question of whether government expenditures crowd in or crowd out private invest-
ment expenditure has, on the other hand, been extensively studied. Theoretically, both the
standard IS-LM framework and the basic real business cycle (RBC) model allows for a posi-
tive effect of government expenditure on private investment expenditure. Within a standard
RBC model, an increase in government expenditure leads to an increase in employment. If
the increase in employment is sufficiently persistent, then this can lead to an increase in
the expected return on capital, which, in turn, may lead to an increase in current private
investment expenditures. Within a standard IS-LM model, an increase in government expen-
diture leads to an increase in aggregate output through the multiplier effect of the increase
in aggregate demand. If the monetary authorities accommodate the increased demand by
increasing the supply of money and thereby keeping the interest rate constant, the increased
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output can lead to increased private investment expenditure through an investment function
that depends on aggregate output.
The theoretical literature is matched, even surpassed, by a large body of literature that
has tried to empirically investigate the issue, ranging from time series to cross sectional to
VAR to panel data studies (Spencer and Yohe, 1970; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Argimon, et
al., 1997; Edelberg, et al., 1999; Furceri and Sousa, 2009). As Table 1 in Furceri and Sousa
(2009) show, there is no consensus on the issue of crowding-out. Some studies report results
in favour of crowding-out Barro, 1991; Mountford and Uhlig, 2004), some present evidence
in favour of crowding-in (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Edelberg et al., 1999; Blanchard and
Perotti, 2002) and others report the absence of any effect of government expenditures on
private investment expenditures (Fatas and Mihov, 2001; Perotti, 2004). This paper adds
to this large and growing literature by investigating the issue of crowding-in within a simple
IS-LM model and using a novel strategy to confront the results from a linear specification
of the model with time series data for the US.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section sets up the basic model and
poses the two questions addressed in this paper; the next section works out the conditions
for the operation of the paradox of thrift in the basic model; the following section derives the
conditions for the possibility of crowding-in; the next section provides the same results with
linear specifications for the key behavioural relationships in the model; the following section
is devoted to the empirical analysis; the final section concludes the paper with indications
of some possible extensions. Details of the data used in the empirical analysis is provided in
an appendix.
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2 The Set-up
Consider a simple short-run aggregate model of a typical capitalist economy which is closed
to international trade in goods, services and capital. To keep the analysis simple and to
understand the essential results, we make two standard assumptions: (1) we assume that
the economy produces only one good, thereby allowing us to talk about “the” good market,
and (2) we assume that the financial market has only one bond, thereby allowing us to talk
about “the” interest rate. Since we are confining ourselves to a short-run model, we will
assume that the price of the single good is given.
2.1 The Good Market
The aggregate demand for the single good produced in this economy arises from consumption,
investment and government expenditures:
Z ≡ C + I + G. (1)
Aggregate consumption expenditure, C, depends on the level of disposable income, YD =
Y − T , where Y is the value of output and T represents the tax revenue of the government;
note that by definition, output is equal to income and hence Y stands for the aggregate level
of income. Aggregate consumption expenditure has an autonomous part too, represented by
c0, and thus we have
C = C(YD, c0), (2)
where C1 ≡ (∂C/∂YD) > 0 and C2 ≡ (∂C/∂c0) > 0. Aggregate investment expenditure, I,
depends on two factors, the level of sales and the interest rate. The level of sales is proxied
by the value of aggregate output, Y , and the interest rate, i, stands for the cost of borrowing
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funds necessary to finance investment expenditures; thus, we have
I = I(Y, i), (3)
where I1 ≡ (∂I/∂Y ) > 0 and I2 ≡ (∂I/∂i) < 0. Government expenditure is assumed to be
exogenous while the tax revenue of the government is assumed to be a function of the level
of aggregate income; thus, we have
G = G¯, (4)
and
T = T (Y ), (5)
where T ′(Y ) ≡ (dT/dY ) > 0. Equilibrium in the good market is attained when aggregate
supply, Y , is equal to aggregate demand, Z, giving us the following condition:
Y = C((Y − T (Y )), c0) + I(Y, i) + G¯. (6)
The equilibrium relationship can also be written as the familiar equality of savings and
investment:
I(Y, i) = S + (T (Y )− G¯), (7)
where S ≡ Y − T − C is the private savings and (T (Y )−G) represents public savings.
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2.2 The Financial Market
There are two types of assets in which wealth can be stored in this simple economy: money
and bonds. By Walras Law, equilibrium in one of the asset markets implies equilibrium in the
other; hence we can focus our attention on only one of the asset markets. The working of the
asset markets determines the interest rate, i, which feeds into aggregate demand through it’s
effect on aggregate investment expenditures. There are two different ways to characterize the
determination of the interest rate, one where the supply of money is considered exogenous
and another where the supply of money is considered endogenous.
Exogenous money supply is the familiar building block of the traditional IS/LM model,
where the Central Bank is assumed to supply some exogenously determined quantity of real
money, M/P , where M is the supply of money and P is the price of the single good; the
supply curve for money can be understood as a vertical line in i−Y space. The demand for
money arises from both the needs to finance transactions and from considerations of foregone
interest income from holding bonds; a simple characterization of the demand for money, Md
is
Md = Md(Y, i). (8)
Hence, equilibrium interest rate is the value of i that ensures
M
P
= Md(Y, i). (9)
The alternative formulation of the determination of the interest rate relies on the claim that
money supply is not exogenous as has been assumed in traditional IS/LM models. In an
advanced capitalist economy with a complex financial architecture, the Central Bank cannot
control the supply of money in any meaningful sense. What it can instead do is to control
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some key interest rates to influence the flow of money and credit in the economy; this is more
or less how the Federal Reserve, the Central Bank of the United States, seems to function.1
Thus, the supply of money adjusts endogenously to the fluctuations in the demand for money
at the level of the interest rate that the Central Bank wants to maintain; the supply of money
can be understood as a horizontal line in i − Y space. With this formulation, the interest
rate becomes exogenous in the short run, determined and defended by the open market
operations of the Central bank:
i = i¯. (10)
It must be noted that this is only one way to operationalize the idea of endogenous money
supply, an issue that has been extensively studied by economists in the post-Keynesian tra-
dition. Summarizing the large literature on endogenous money, Palley (2002), points out the
various senses in which money supply can be understood as being endogenous: central bank
endogeniety, fiscal endogeneity, portfolio endogeneity, endogeneity of credit money, among
others. According to the debates within the post-Keynesian tradition, the operationalization
of endogenous money that is captured by (10) can be called the accommodationist view of
money supply endogeneity.
2.3 Basic Model and Questions
The simple short-run aggregate model of the economy that we are working with, thus, has
two endogenous variables, Y (aggregate output) and i (the interest rate) and two equilibrium
1See the website of the Federal Open Market Committee for a succinct statement of what the Fed means
by “monetary policy” and how it affects the federal funds rate, a key short-term interest rate; for instance
see http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm
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relationships:
Y = C((Y − T (Y )), c0) + I(Y, i) + G¯
and
M
P
= Md(Y, i)
or
i = i¯,
where the crucial exogenous variables are c0 (autonomous part of aggregate consumption
expenditure) and G¯ (aggregate government expenditure). The first gives the familiar IS
relation and the second gives the LM relation; the third is an alternative formulation for
the determination of the interest rate and rests on a simple operationalization of the idea of
endogenous money supply. We want to pose two questions in this simple model.
The first question that we wish to pose is to understand the conditions under which the
“paradox of thrift” would be in operation. The paradox of thrift, as pointed out earlier, is the
phenomenon whereby attempts by consumers to reduce aggregate consumption expenditure
and increase aggregate savings might, in fact, lead to the opposite effect: reduction of savings.
The simple reason is that when consumers reduce consumption expenditures that reduces
aggregate output and income through the multiplier and thus consumers are left with a lower
level of aggregate income to save from; the net result might very well be a fall in aggregate
savings negating the original intentions of the consumers.
The second question we wish to address is to understand the conditions under which
“crowding-in” can become operational. Crowding-in, as discussed above, is the claim that
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government expenditures can, under certain conditions, increase the level of aggregate private
investment expenditures rather than crowding them out as is often claimed by economists of
Monetarist persuasion. The logic is simple. If investment expenditures by firms respond to
the level of sales and if aggregate output can be a proxy for aggregate sales, then exogenous
increases in government expenditures can increase investment expenditures due to the boost
to aggregate demand that it gives, leading to a higher level of equilibrium aggregate output
and income.
3 The Paradox of Thrift
The paradox of thrift refers to a situation where aggregate savings in an economy declines
or remains unchanged despite, or precisely because, consumers try to reduce autonomous
consumption expenditures and increase savings. To understand the conditions under which
this result might arise in our simple aggregate short-run model, let us recall the savings-
investment equality, which is one way to characterise equilibrium in the good market:
I(Y, i) = S + T (Y )− G¯.
One way to investigate the paradox of thrift is to understand how a change in autonomous
consumption expenditure affects the level of aggregate savings, i.e., to determine the sign of
the derivative dS/dc0. When the sign of the derivative is positive, the paradox of thrift is
in operation because autonomous consumption expenditure and aggregate savings move in
the same direction: an decrease in autonomous consumption expenditure reduces aggregate
savings. Since S = I(Y, i)− T (Y ) + G¯, we have
dS
dc0
= I1
dY
dc0
+ I2
di
dc0
− T ′(Y )dY
dc0
, (11)
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where I1 = (∂I/∂Y ), I2 = (∂I/∂i) and T
′(Y ) = (dT/dY ). We wish to investigate conditions
under which the expression in (11) is non-negative.
3.1 Exogenous Money
When the supply of money is assumed to be exogenous, equilibrium levels of aggregate
output, Y , and interest rate, i are determined by the following two equations:
Y = C((Y − T (Y )), c0) + I(Y, i) + G¯
and
M
P
= Md(Y, i).
Thus, in this case, we have
dS
dc0
=
{
I1 − I2
(
Md1
Md2
)
− T ′(Y )
}
C2{
1− C1(1− T ′(Y ))− I1 + I2(M
d
1
Md2
)
} (12)
where C1 = (∂C/∂YD), C2 = (∂C/∂c0), M
d
1 = (∂M
d/∂Y ) and Md2 = (∂M
d/∂i). This gives
us the first result as
Proposition 1 If
T ′(Y ) ≤ I1 − I2
(
Md1
Md2
)
− T ′(Y ) ≤ 1− C1(1− T ′(Y ))
then dS/dc0 ≥ 0 and the paradox of thrift is in operation.
Remarks: The proof follows easily by investigating the conditions under which the ratio on
the RHS of (12) is non-negative.
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To interpret the condition in the above proposition, note that the expected signs of the
terms are as follows: T ′(Y ) > 0, I1 > 0, I2 < 0,Md1 > 0,M
d
2 < 0, 0 < C1 < 1. Since
0 < T ′(Y ) < 1, we have (1 − C1)T ′(Y ) < (1 − C1), and so T ′(Y ) < 1 − C1(1 − T ′(Y ));
thus, as long as I1 − I2(Md1 /Md2 ) − T ′(Y ) lies between these two quantities the paradox
of thrift will be in operation. On the one hand, this means that I1 − I2(Md1 /Md2 ) must
be greater than 2T ′(Y ); on the other it means that I1 − I2(Md1 /Md2 ) must be less than
1− C1 + C1T ′(Y ) + T ′(Y ).
Now, I1−I2(Md1 /Md2 ) = Md1 (I1/Md1 −I2/Md2 ). Thus, the condition boils down to the fact
that the difference of the response of investment expenditure to changes in aggregate output
and the interest rate, both scaled by corresponding responses of the demand for money
should be greater than twice the response of tax revenues to aggregate output scaled by
the response of the demand for money to aggregate output but smaller than the sum of the
marginal propensity to save, 1− C1, and a positive term involving the marginal propensity
to consume and the effect of aggregate output on the tax revenue, but again scaled by the
response of the demand for money to aggregate output. The condition can, therefore, be
written as:
T ′(Y )
Md1
≤ I1
Md1
− I2
Md2
≤ 1− C1 + C1T
′(Y ) + T ′(Y )
Md1
;
the condition, therefore, requires that the difference of the response of investment to ag-
gregate output scaled by the response of the money demand function to aggregate output
and the response of investment to the interest rate scaled by the response of the money
demand function to the interest rate be bounded by two quantities: below by the response
of tax revenues to aggregate output scaled by the response of the money demand function
to aggregate output, and above by the marginal propensity to save scaled by the response
of the money demand function to aggregate output.
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3.2 Endogenous Money
When the Central Bank is assumed, more realistically, to set and defend an interest rate
by allowing the money supply to be endogenously determined by the demand for money,
equilibrium levels of aggregate output, Y , and interest rate, i are determined by the following
two equations:
Y = C((Y − T (Y )), c0) + I(Y, i) + G¯
and
i = i¯.
Thus, in this scenario, we have
dS
dc0
=
{I1 − T ′(Y )}C2
{1− C1(1− T ′(Y ))− I1} .
This gives us the next result as
Proposition 2 If
T ′(Y ) ≤ I1 ≤ 1− C1(1− T ′(Y ))
then dS/dc0 ≥ 0 and the paradox of thrift is in operation.
Remark: Since the interest rate is now exogenous and fixed by the Central Bank, the effect
of the interest on aggregate investment expenditure, I2, is zero; hence the term involving I2
drops out.
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4 Crowding-In
The next issue that we wish to address is whether, and under what conditions, government
expenditures can crowd-in, i.e., increase, private investment expenditure. Since, in our simple
model, aggregate investment expenditure is influenced by aggregate output (as a proxy
for aggregate sales) and the interest rate (as a proxy for the cost of financing investment
expenditures), we have
dI
dG
= I1
dY
dG
+ I2
dY
di
. (13)
Now we wish to investigate the conditions under which the expression in (13) is positive,
because a positive value of the derivative implies that government expenditures and private
investment expenditures move together: when government expenditures increase, that leads
to an increase in aggregate private expenditure.
4.1 Exogenous Money
In the case when money is considered to be exogenous, we have, as before, equilibrium
determined by the following two equations:
Y = C((Y − T (Y )), c0) + I(Y, i) + G¯
and
M
P
= Md(Y, i).
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Thus, we have
dI
dG
=
{
I1 − I2
(
Md1
Md2
)}
{
1− C1(1− T ′(Y ))− I1 + I2(M
d
1
Md2
)
} ,
which gives us the next result as
Proposition 3 If
0 ≤ I1 − I2
(
Md1
Md2
)
≤ 1− C1(1− T ′(Y ))
then dI/dG ≥ 0 and government expenditures crowd-in private investment expenditures.
Remark: Since 1−C1(1−T ′(Y )) > 0, crowding-in occurs whenever I1−I2
(
Md1
Md2
)
is positive
but less than 1− C1(1− T ′(Y )). To interpret the condition, we can re-write it as
0 ≤ I1
Md1
− I2
Md2
≤ 1− C1 + C1T
′(Y )
Md1
.
Thus, as long as the difference of the response of investment to aggregate output scaled
by the response of the money demand function to aggregate output and the response of
investment to the interest rate scaled by the response of money demand to the interest rate
is positive but less than the marginal propensity to save, (1− C1) scaled by the response of
money demand with respect to aggregate output, the economy will experience crowding-in
of private investment expenditure.
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4.2 Endogenous Money
With the interest rate exogenous and the supply of money endogenous, equilibrium is deter-
mined by
Y = C((Y − T (Y )), c0) + I(Y, i) + G¯
and
i = i¯.
In this case,
dI
dG
=
I1
{1− C1(1− T ′(Y ))− I1} ,
which gives us the next result as
Proposition 4 If
0 ≤ I1 ≤ 1− C1(1− T ′(Y ))
then dI/dG ≥ 0 and government expenditures crowd-in private investment expenditures.
5 Results under Linear Specification
To test the key results of this paper, i.e., the four propositions, we will work with linear
specifications of the behavioural equations of the model: the aggregate consumption function,
the investment function, the tax revenue function and the money demand function. Since
aggregate consumption expenditure is a function of c0 and disposable income, YD, a linear
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specification of the consumption function that is commonly used is the following:
C = c0 + c1YD, (14)
where 0 < c1 < 1 is the marginal propensity to consume. Using the fact that aggregate
investment expenditure is a function of Y and i, we will use the following linear investment
function:
I = b0 + b1Y + b3i, (15)
where b1 > 0 and b3 < 0. A linear specification of the tax revenue function that we will use
is:
T = t0 + t1Y, (16)
where 0 < t1 < 1 is the marginal tax rate. A linear specification of the money demand
function that we will use is the following:
Md = a0 + a1Y + a2i, (17)
where a1 > 0 and a2 < 0. Since the demand for money is known to display non-linearities,
a better specification of the money demand function might be:
ln(Md) = a0 + a1 ln(Y ) + a2 ln(i), (18)
where a1 > 0 and a2 < 0. With these linear specifications, the main results of this paper
can be re-written in terms of a few crucial parameters, which can then be estimated using
macroeconomic data.
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5.1 Paradox of Thrift
Here we re-state the two results about the paradox of thrift for the linear specification of the
behavioural equations.
Proposition 5 (Exogenous Money) If (14), (15), (16) and (17) are used as representations
of the behavioural equations of the model and
t1 ≤ b1 − b2a1
a2
− t1 ≤ 1− c1 + c1t1
then (dS/dc0 ≥ 0) and the paradox of thrift is in operation. If (18) is instead used as a
specification for the money demand function and
t1 ≤ b1 − b2a1
a2
i
Y
− t1 ≤ 1− c1 + c1t1,
where i and Y refer to some suitable average values of the interest rate and aggregate output,
then (dS/dc0 ≥ 0) and the paradox of thrift is in operation.
Proposition 6 (Endogenous Money) If (14), (15), (16) are used as representations of the
behavioural equations of the model and money supply is endogenous, i.e., i = i¯ and we also
have
t1 ≤ b1 ≤ 1− c1 + c1t1
then (dS/dc0 ≥ 0) and the paradox of thrift is in operation.
5.2 Crowding-In
Now we re-state the key results on crowding-in of private investment expenditure by govern-
ment expenditure for a linear specification of the behavioural equations of the model.
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Proposition 7 (Exogenous Money) If (14), (15), (16) and (17) are used as representations
of the behavioural equations of the model and
0 ≤ b1 − b2a1
a2
≤ 1− c1 + c1t1
then (dI/dG ≥ 0) and the crowding-in effect of government expenditures is in operation. If
(18) is instead used as a specification for the money demand function and
0 ≤ b1 − b2a1
a2
i
Y
≤ 1− c1 + c1t1
where i and Y refer to some suitable average values of the interest rate and aggregate out-
put, then (dI/dG ≥ 0) and private investment expenditure is crowded-in by government
expenditure.
Proposition 8 (Endogenous Money) If (14), (15), (16) are used as representations of the
behavioural equations of the model and money supply is endogenous, i.e., i = i¯ and we also
have
0 ≤ b1 ≤ 1− c1 + c1t1
then (dI/dG ≥ 0) and government expenditures crowd-in private investment expenditure.
6 Empirical Analysis
What does the empirical evidence from the US economy show about the possibility of the
occurrence of the paradox of thrift and crowding in? To answer this question, and link
up with the results from the simple model in this paper, we will estimate the parameters
that appear in Proposition 5, 6, 7 and 8: the marginal propensity to consume (c1), the
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marginal effect of aggregate output on tax revenues (t1), the marginal effect of aggregate
output on investment (b1) and the marginal effect of interest rates on investment (b2). Using
estimates for these four crucial parameters, we will use devise statistical tests to check
whether Proposition 5, 6, 7 and 8 are confirmed or rejected by the data.
6.1 Empirical Models
To motivate estimation of the consumption function, let us refer to Figure 1, which is scatter
plot of quarterly change of consumption and the quarterly change of disposable income. As
can be seen from the figure, there appears to be a strong positive relation between changes in
consumption expenditure and changes in disposable income. Since we are interested in the
marginal effect of disposable income on aggregate consumption expenditure, this suggests
that we estimate the following linear form of the relationship between aggregate consumption
and disposable income:
Ct = c0 + c1YD,t + u1,t
which, on differencing, gives
∆Ct = c1∆YD,t + ε1t,
where ∆Ct = Ct − Ct−1 is the first difference of real aggregate consumption expenditure,
∆YD,t = YD,t− YD,t−1 is the first difference of real disposable income, ε1t = u1,t− u1,t−1, and
the parameter of interest is c1, the marginal propensity to consume.
2 Since some effect of
past changes in disposable income on current consumption expenditure cannot be ruled out,
we include a lagged independent variable to capture this possibility; hence, the equation we
2A difference specification has been used in all the regression equation because of the presence of unit
roots in all the variables that this paper deals with; for details of unit root tests see the data appendix.
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estimate is
∆Ct = c1∆YD,t + c2∆YD,t−1 + ε1t. (19)
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Figure 1: Change in Consumption versus Change in Disposable Income
Estimating (19) by ordinary least squares (OLS) is problematic because of endogeneity
problems. Not only do changes in disposable income affect aggregate consumption expen-
diture, but changes in aggregate consumption expenditure also affects disposable income
through the multiplier effect of changes in aggregate consumption on aggregate output; thus,
there is problem of simultaneous causation.3 One way to deal with this potential problem
of endogeneity is use instrumental variables (IV) regression. With a proper instrument for
3Note that the lagged independent variable is exogenous because current changes in consumption expen-
diture cannot affect past changes in disposable income.
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changes in disposable income, one would be able to capture the effect of exogenous changes
in disposable income on aggregate consumption expenditure; that would, then, provide a
consistent estimate of the marginal propensity to consume, c1.
A good instrument must satisfy two criterion: (a) it must be correlated with the regressor,
in this case changes in disposable income, and (b) it must affect the dependent variable,
in this case changes in aggregate consumption expenditure, only through the endogenous
regressor and not directly. It is only then that the part of the variation in the endogenous
regressor that is not explained by the instrument can be used as a source of exogenous
variation to consistently estimate the effect of the regressor on the dependent variable. These
considerations suggest that changes in non-residential fixed investment expenditures can act
as a legitimate instrument for changes in disposable income. Changes in non-residential
fixed investment spending would affect aggregate output through the multiplier and would
hence affect disposable income but there is no reason to believe that it would directly affect
aggregate consumption expenditure. Hence, we will use non-residential fixed investment
spending as an instrument for the estimation of (19).
The next relationship that we need to estimate is the tax revenue function. To motivate
the estimation, let us look at Figure 2, which is a scatter plot of changes in real tax revenue
versus changes in real output. The figure suggests that there is a positive relationship
between the two variables and so we will estimate the following simple linear tax revenue
function:
Tt = t0 + t1Yt + u2,t,
which, in first difference form, is
∆Tt = t1∆Yt + ε2t,
22
where ∆Tt = Tt− Tt−1 is the first difference of real tax revenues, ∆Yt = Yt− Yt−1 is the first
difference of real GDP, ε2t = u2,t − u2,t−1 and the parameter of interest is t1, the marginal
tax rate. To take account of possible delays in the effect of aggregate output on tax revenue,
we also include a lagged independent variable in the regression equation; hence, we estimate
the following:
∆Tt = t1∆Yt + t2∆Yt−1 + ε2,t. (20)
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Figure 2: Change in Tax Revenue versus Change in Output
Estimating (20) by OLS runs into the same problems as the consumption function: si-
multaneous causation leading to endogeneity. While it is obvious that changes in aggregate
output will affect the tax revenue, it is equally true that changes in taxes will affect aggregate
output through its effect on aggregate demand via changes in disposable income. We can,
23
as before, deal with the problem of consistent estimation of t1 by using IV regression. We
can use changes in government defence expenditure as an instrument for changes in aggre-
gate output: while changes in defence expenditures of the government will affect aggregate
output through its effect on aggregate demand, it can be reasonably expected that changes
in defence expenditures of the government will not directly impact changes in aggregate tax
revenues.
Next, we will estimate the following linear specification of an aggregate investment func-
tion:
It = b0 + b1Yt + b2it + u3,t,
which, in first difference form, is
∆It = b1∆Yt + b2∆it + ε3t, (21)
where ∆It = It− It−1 is the first difference of real aggregate private investment expenditure,
∆Yt = Yt − Yt−1 is the first difference of real GDP, ∆it = it − it−1 is the first difference of a
long-term interest rate, ε3t = u3,t − u3,t−1 and the parameters of interest are b1 and b2.
Just as in the case of the consumption function, estimating the parameters in (21) cannot
use OLS because of problems of endogeneity; both the regressors are likely to be endogenous
because of two-way causation. While it is obvious that changes in aggregate output (acting
as a proxy for aggregate sales) and changes in the interest rate (acting as a measure for the
cost of finance) affects aggregate investment expenditure, it is also the case that causation
might run the other way too. Changes in aggregate investment expenditures are likely to
impact aggregate output through the multiplier; similarly, changes in aggregate investment
expenditure might affect market interest rates when large parts of investment expenditures
are debt-financed, as is typical in capitalist countries. Hence, we need to use instruments for
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both the regressors in (21).
Two instruments suggest themselves naturally, change in consumption expenditure as
an instrument for change in aggregate output and change in narrow money (M1) as an
instrument for the change in interest rate. Changes in aggregate consumption expenditure
will affect the aggregate output through the multiplier but can be expected not to have any
direct impact on aggregate investment expenditure. Similarly, changes in M1 will affect the
interest rate by affecting the tightness of the money market, but it can be expected not to
directly affect aggregate investment expenditure, i.e., changes in narrow money will affect
aggregate investment expenditure only through the channel of market interest rates.
6.2 Data and Estimates
Estimation of (19), (21) and (20) uses macroeconomic data for the US economy at quarterly
frequency obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis; more details of the data are provided in an appendix. Table 1 summarises
estimation results using both OLS and the method of two-stage least squares (2SLS) for
two separate, but overlapping, time periods: 1959 − 2009 and 1974 − 2009. The separate
focus on these two time periods is motivated by the well-known fact that the US economy
entered a slow-growth regime when compared to the 25 years following the second world
war, often referred to as the Golden Age of capitalism. Since the paradox of thrift might be
expected to operate more strongly during periods of stagnation of capitalist economies, it
will be instructive to study the sub-period, 1974− 2009, separately.
All the estimates have expected signs except the one for b2, but the estimate of b2, using
IV regression, is not statistically significantly different from zero. The statistically significant
2SLS estimates of the parameters have straightforward interpretations. Since for the period
1959 − 2009, cˆ1 = 0.607, it means that every dollar increase in disposable income leads to
an increase in aggregate consumption expenditure by 61 cents; a similar scenario obtains in
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the sub-period, 1974− 2009 too. Moving to the tax revenue function we see that tˆ1 = 0.238
for the period 1959 − 2009 and tˆ1 = 0.227 in the sub-period; this means that every dollar
increase in aggregate output leads to about 24 cents in increased tax revenues for both
periods. We see that the investment function displays the main change in the estimates for
the two periods. Since bˆ1 = 0.209 for the period 1959−2009, this implies that for every dollar
increase in aggregate output, aggregate investment expenditures increase by about 21 cents.
The corresponding estimate for the sub-period 1974 − 2009 is bˆ1 = 0.254; hence, aggregate
investment expenditure is about 20% more responsive to changes in aggregate output in the
sub-period of slow growth. The fact that bˆ2 is not statistically significant from zero in both
the time periods implies that the interest elasticity of investment expenditures is negligible.
6.3 Testing for the Paradox of Thrift
Using 2SLS estimates of the crucial parameters reported in Table 1, we can devise statistical
tests of Propositions 5 and Proposition 6. But we will restrict ourselves to only testing
Proposition 6; this is because of two reasons. One, endogenous money captured by the Cen-
tral Bank setting interest rates is more realistic and in line with evidence about how the Fed
actually operates in practice. Second, note that the main difference in the conditions for
Propositions 5 and 6 arise from the term involving b2, the effect of interest rates on invest-
ment expenditure; but Table 1 shows that the estimate of b2 is not statistically significantly
different from zero. Hence, we can restrict ourselves to Proposition 6.
Since the estimate of b2 is not statistically different from zero, terms involving b2 can
be safely ignored. This implies that the parameters in the money demand function, which
give an idea of the elasticity of money demand both with respect to income and interest
rates, are not required for our analysis; that is why we did not estimate the money demand
function. Of course, there is a large literature which deals with the estimation of money
demand functions and we could have drawn on the results emerging from that literature if
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we had needed to; for a recent and innovative method of estimation see Bae and de Jong
(2007), and for a review of the literature see Sriram (2001).
Note that the condition in Proposition 6 is the following: t1 ≤ b1 ≤ 1− c1 + c1t1. Since
economic theory suggests that c1 > 0 and t1 > 0, the condition will be satisfied as long
as we have: t1 ≤ b1 ≤ 1 − c1. We can break this into two inequalities: 0 ≤ b1 − t1 and
b1 + c1 − 1 ≤ 0. Hence, the first hypothesis test emerges as:
H0 : b1 − t1 = 0;H1 : b1 − t1 > 0; (22)
and the second hypothesis test becomes
H0 : b1 + c1 − 1 = 0;H1 : b1 + c1 − 1 < 0. (23)
The test statistic for the hypothesis test in (22) is
T1 =
bˆ1 − tˆ1√
SE(bˆ1)2 + SE(tˆ1)2
,
and under the null hypothesis H0 : b1 − t1 = 0, it becomes
T1 =
bˆ1 − tˆ1 − b1 + t1√
SE(bˆ1)2 + SE(tˆ1)2
,
which, in large samples, is distributed as a standard normal random variable.
From the first panel in Table 1, we see that bˆ1 < tˆ1; hence, there is no evidence, even
weak, in favour of the alternative. Since we cannot reject the null in (22), we need not even
test the null in (23). Thus, the data seems to suggest that the paradox of thrift is not in
operation in the linear representation of the US economy for the period from 1959 to 2009.
Basic economic theory suggests that the paradox of thrift has a higher probability to
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be in operation when a capitalist economy is in a downturn. Since the period from 1974
onwards has been widely recognized as period of relative stagnation in the US economy, we
would now like to carry out the same test for this sub-period. From the second panel Table 1
for the period 1974− 2009, we see that bˆ1 > tˆ1; so, there seems to be some evidence for the
operation of the paradox of thrift. The actual value of T1, in his case, is
T act1 =
0.254− 0.227√
0.0992 + 0.0802
= 0.212.
The test statistic has a positive value though it is not large enough to reject the null in
favour of the alternative; compared to the situation in the period 1959− 2009, of course this
provides stronger support for the possibility that 0 ≤ b1− t1. We can at least claim that the
evidence does not lend support to the hypothesis that bˆ1 < tˆ1; since bˆ1 = tˆ1 is compatible
with the operation of the paradox of thrift, we will now test the other half of the condition,
namely (23). The test statistic is
T2 =
bˆ1 + cˆ1 − 1√
SE(bˆ1)2 + SE(cˆ1)2
,
and under the null hypothesis H0 : b1 − t1 = 0, it becomes
T1 =
bˆ1 + cˆ1 − 1− b1 − c1 + 1√
SE(bˆ1)2 + SE(cˆ1)2
,
which, in large samples, is distributed as a standard normal random variable. The actual
value of the test statistic for the period 1974− 2009 is
T act4 =
0.254 + 0.604− 1√
0.0992 + 0.0602
= −1.226,
which corresponds to a p-value of 0.11. Together with the fact that we have evidence for
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bˆ1 = tˆ1, this suggests that the paradox of thrift is in operation during the period 1974−2009.
6.4 Testing for Crowding-in of Private Investment
We can devise a statistical test for Proposition 7 and 8 in an exactly similar manner. For
the same two reasons that we stated earlier, we can restrict ourselves to Proposition 8 only.
Note that the condition in Proposition8 is the following: 0 < b1 < 1 − c1 + c1t1. Since,
as before, economic theory suggests that c1 > 0 and t1 > 0, the condition will be satisfied
as long as we have: 0 < b1 < 1 − c1. We can break this into two inequalities: 0 < b1 and
b1 + c1 − 1 < 0. Hence, the first hypothesis test emerges as:
H0 : b1 = 0;H1 : b1 > 0; (24)
and the second hypothesis test becomes
H0 : b1 + c1 − 1 = 0;H1 : b1 + c1 − 1 < 0. (25)
The test statistic for the hypothesis test in (22) is
T3 =
bˆ1 − b1
SE(bˆ1)
,
and under the null hypothesis H0 : b1 = 0 and in large samples, it is distributed as a standard
normal random variable. From Table 1, we see that under the null hypothesis, the actual
value of T3 is
T act3 =
0.209
0.043
= 4.86,
which gives a p-value of 0.000; thus we can easily reject the null in favour of the alternative
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in (24). In a similar manner we can see that the test statistic for (25) is
T4 =
bˆ1 + cˆ1 − 1√
SE(bˆ1)2 + SE(cˆ1)2
,
and under the null, H0 : b1 + c1 − 1 = 0, it becomes
T4 =
bˆ1 + cˆ1 − 1− b1 − c1 + 1√
SE(bˆ1)2 + SE(cˆ1)2
,
which is distributed as a normal random variable in large samples. Using parameter and
standard error estimates from Table 1, we see that under the null hypothesis, the actual
value of T4 is
T act4 =
0.209 + 0.607− 1√
0.0432 + 0.0522
= −2.727,
which gives a p-value of 0.003. This implies that we can reject the null hypothesis in both
(24) and (25). Hence, if linear specifications of the consumption, investment and tax revenue
functions are good approximations of aggregate macroeconomic reality, then the US economy
provides strong evidence for the existence of crowding-in of private investment expenditure
by government expenditure during the period 1959− 2009.
7 Conclusion
The paradox of thrift refers to the phenomenon where aggregate savings in a capitalist
economy declines despite efforts by consumers to reduce their consumption expenditures;
crowding-in of private investment expenditure by government expenditures refer to the phe-
nomenon whereby increases in government expenditures increases, rather than decrease,
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Table 1: Estimation Results
1959-2009
OLS 2SLS
CONSUMPTION FUNCTIONa cˆ1 = 0.525
d cˆ1 = 0.607
(∆Ct = c1∆YD,t + c2∆YD,t−1 + ε1t) (0.041) (0.052)
TAX REVENUE FUNCTIONb tˆ1 = 0.263 tˆ1 = 0.238
(∆Tt = t1∆Yt + t2∆Yt−1 + ε2,t) (0.037) (0.062)
INVESTMENT FUNCTIONc bˆ1 = 0.381 bˆ2 = 18.304 bˆ1 = 0.209 bˆ2 = 62.751
(∆It = b1∆Yt + b2∆it + ε3,t) (0.029) (5.957) (0.043) (50.173)
1974-2009
OLS 2SLS
CONSUMPTION FUNCTIONa cˆ1 = 0.512 cˆ1 = 0.604
(∆Ct = c1∆YD,t + c2∆YD,t−1 + ε1t) (0.049) (0.060)
TAX REVENUE FUNCTIONb tˆ1 = 0.272 tˆ1 = 0.227
(∆Tt = t1∆Yt + t2∆Yt−1 + ε2,t) (0.046) (0.080)
INVESTMENT FUNCTIONc bˆ1 = 0.390 bˆ2 = 20.711 bˆ1 = 0.254 bˆ2 = 167.931
(∆It = b1∆Yt + b2∆it + ε3,t) (0.036) (7.189) (0.099) (139.930)
a Quarterly frequency; variables measured in billions of 2005 dollars; instrument is change in
nonresidential fixed investment expenditure; summary statistics of the variables relevant for this
regression is given in Table 2. The instrument relevance condition is checked using the F-statistic of the
first stage regression.
b Quarterly frequency; variables measured in billions of 2005 dollars; instrument is change in total
government defence expenditure and change in aggregate investment expenditure; summary statistics of
the variables relevant for this regression is given in Table 3. The instrument relevance condition is
checked using the F-statistic of the first stage regression.
c Quarterly frequency; variables measured in billions of 2005 chained dollars; instruments are changes in
personal consumption expenditure and changes in narrow money; summary statistics of the variables
relevant for this regression is given in Table 4.
d Hat quantities are estimates of the coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses below the
estimates.
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private investment expenditures. Both these propositions are key results in the Keynesian
analysis of short-run fluctuations of capitalist economies, and contrast the Keynesian from
Monetarist and New Classical approaches. This paper has derived the conditions within a
simple IS/LM model under which the paradox of thrift and crowding-in of private investment
expenditures by government expenditures can occur; this exercise has been carried out both
in the context of exogenous and endogenous money.
Using macroeconomic data from the US economy, this paper has also estimated the
parameters of a set of linear behavioural equations - the consumption, investment and tax
revenue function - using instrumental variables regression. These estimates were then used
to test for the existence of the paradox of thrift and possibility of crowding-in of private
investment expenditures. If the money supply is taken to be endogenous, as seems realistic,
the estimates show that during the period 1974−2009, there is evidence for operation of the
paradox of thrift; the evidence for the paradox of thrift is not there for the period 1959−2009.
This is more or less what would be expected, given that the period since 1974 has been a
period of relative stagnation of US capitalism and that the paradox of thrift is more likely to
be in effect during periods of economic stagnation. When we understand the money supply
process as being endogenous, the evidence also points to the strong crowding-in effect of
private investment expenditure by government expenditure for the period 1959− 2009.
This analysis can be extended in two separate directions. In this paper, we have ignored
the role of expectations in the determination of short-run equilibrium; this is unrealistic
and one possible direction to extend the analysis in this paper is to explicitly incorporate
expectations into the picture. The other direction in which the analysis could be extended
is to bring in open economy considerations into the story.
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Appendix
The basic data for this analysis has been taken from two sources: the US Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) and the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis.
• Consumption function: For estimation of the marginal propensity to consume in
(19), the following three data series, at quarterly frequency, have been used: aggregate
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real consumption expenditure, real disposable income and aggregate real investment
expenditure; the data series runs from 1959 : Q1 to 2009 : Q2. The nominal consump-
tion expenditure and nominal investment expenditure series is taken from NIPA Table
1.1.5 from the website of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); the data for
the GDP deflator is taken from NIPA Table 1.1.9 of the BEA. Real quantities are ob-
tained by dividing corresponding nominal quantities by the GDP deflator. Summary
statistics and results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests have been reported
in Table 2. Results of the unit root tests show that the presence of unit roots can-
not be rejected; hence the difference specification of the regression equation is justified.
• Tax revenue function: For estimating the marginal tax change due to a change in
aggregate output in (20), the following five data series, at quarterly frequency, have
been used: real tax revenue, real GDP, real investment expenditure and real defence
expenditure of the government, the GDP deflator; the data series runs from 1959 : Q1
to 2009 : Q2. Nominal tax revenue data is taken from NIPA Table 3.1 of the BEA;
nominal GDP, investment and defence expenditure data is taken from NIPA Table
1.1.5; the data for the GDP deflator is taken from NIPA Table 1.1.9 of the BEA. Real
quantities are obtained by dividing corresponding nominal quantities by the GDP de-
flator. Summary statistics and results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests
have been reported in Table 3. Results of the unit root tests show that the presence of
unit roots cannot be rejected at the 1 percent significance level for any of the variables;
hence the difference specification of the regression equation is justified.
• Investment function: For estimation of the parameters of the investment function in
(21), the following five data series, again at quarterly frequency, have been used: real
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Table 2: Consumption Function: Summary Statistics and ADF Unit
Root Test (1959− 2009)
DF-Stata Median Std Dev N
CONSUMPTIONb −1.751 41.39 23.33 202
(0.681)
DISPOSABLE INCOME −1.145 47.67 24.43 202
(0.913)
INVESTMENT −1.489 2.53 0.88 202
(0.789)
a Null hypothesis: time series has unit root; p-values in parentheses.
b All variables are measured in 2005 dollars.
GDP, real consumption expenditure, real investment expenditure, the AAA corporate
bond yield, and the stock of narrow money (M1); the data series runs from 1959 : Q1
to 2009 : Q2. Data for real GDP, consumption, and investment are taken from NIPA
Table 1.1.6 and are measured in 2005 chained dollars; the AAA corporate bond yield
and the stock of narrow money is taken from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. Summary statistics and results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit
root tests have been reported in Table 4. Results of the unit root tests show that
the presence of unit roots cannot be rejected; hence the difference specification of the
regression equation is justified.
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Table 3: Tax Function: Summary Statistics and ADF Unit Root Tests (1959 −
2009)
DF-Stata Median Std Dev N
REAL TAX REVENUEb −3.690 12.78 6.28 202
(0.026)
REAL GDP −1.784 65.04 31.97 202
(0.667)
REAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE −2.297 4.09 1.03 202
(0.452)
REAL INVESTMENT −2.559 11.19 5.25 202
(0.342)
a Null hypothesis: time series has unit root; p-values in parentheses.
b All variables measured in 2005 dollars.
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Table 4: Investment Function: Summary Statisticsa and ADF Unit
Root Tests (1959− 2009)
DF-Statb Median Std Dev N
REAL GDP −1.781 6503.95 3197.02 202
(0.668)
REAL CONSUMPTION −1.721 4269.55 2297.83 202
(0.693)
REAL INVESTMENT −2.069 893.95 585.60 202
(0.547)
AAA BOND YEILD −1.474 7.41 2.48 202
(0.796)
NARROW MONEY (M1) −1.861 532.65 448.32 202
(0.634)
a GDP, consumption and investment measured in chained 2005 dollars; M1
measured in current dollars, and bond yield measured in percentages.
b Null hypothesis: time series has unit root.
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